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PRIVILEGE, GENDER, AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: RECLAIMING EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAWS
by STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN'
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
"No state shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."1
In the wake of Grutter v. Bollinger' and Gratz v. Bollinger,' cases some have
touted as the most important civil rights decisions of the last several decades, 4 it is
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This requirement to extend the equal protection of the laws also
applies to the federal government under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
2. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). In Grutter, the Court examined the University of Michigan law school
admissions policy. The policy sought to achieve diversity in law school classes, recognizing many
possible bases for diversity. The school sought to admit students from groups which have historically
been discriminated against, including African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans. Id. at 2332.
Because the admissions policy considered race as one factor among many and gave substantial weight to
other diversity factors, the Court found that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
did not prohibit the law school's narrowly tailored use of race in its admissions decisions to further the
compelling state interest of achieving a diverse student body. Id. at 2347.
3. 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003). In Gratz, two white Michigan residents, denied admission to the
University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts, challenged the school's admission
policy. The policy utilized a point system, granting applicants points for their high school grade point
average, standardized test scores, academic quality of their high school, strength of high school
curriculum, in-state residency, alumni relationship, personal essay, and personal achievement or
leadership. The policy also included a "miscellaneous" category, which awarded an applicant twenty
extra points for membership in an underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group. Under this system,
an applicant could score a total of 150 points, with 100 points necessary for admission. Id. at 2439. The
Court found that the policy, which automatically distributed one-fifth of the points necessary to be
admitted solely on the basis of race, did not meet the requirement of being narrowly tailored to achieve
the compelling interest of educational diversity. Id. at 2427-28. Echoing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), the Court held that diversity in education remains a compelling state
interest, but that the University of Michigan must devise a system that considers each applicant as an
individual and assesses his or her unique characteristics, including race, in light of their potential
contribution to a diverse educational experience. Id. at 2428.
4. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Back Affirmative Action by 5-4, But Wider Vote Bans a
Racial Point System, N. Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at AI (stating "[t]he result of today's rulings was that
[the view that] there was a 'compelling state interest' in racial diversity, a position that had appeared
undermined by the [C]ourt's subsequent equal protection rulings in other contexts ... has now been
endorsed.. . and placed on a stronger footing than ever before"); David G. Savage, Court Affirms Use of
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time to reexamine the wreckage of the last thirty years of equal protection
jurisprudence. The poster child for this devastation has been the intent
requirement.' Nowhere does the phrase "intent requirement" appear in the
Race in University Admissions; Justices Render Two Close Decisions Involving the University of
Michigan, Los ANGELES TIMES, June 24, 2003, at Al (stating that "[tihis is a historic day for the
achievement of civil rights in America ... [t]he Court rejected arguments that would have turned the
clock back on 50 years of civil rights progress."); Charles Lane, Affirmative Action for Diversity is
Upheld; in 5-4 Vote, Justices Approve U-Mich. Law School Plan, WASH. POST, June 24, 2003, at AOl
(stating that "[t]he Supreme Court issued a qualified but resounding endorsement of affirmative action in
higher education ... [ratifying] diversity as a rationale for race-conscious admissions and [laying] out a
constitutionally-acceptable means for achieving it.").
5. The intent requirement first appeared as a creation of the United States Supreme Court in
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 230-31 (1976). According to the Court, a plaintiff claiming
discrimination in violation of the equal protection of the laws must prove that the perpetrator intended
the discrimination. In Davis, plaintiffs had challenged the employment exam used by the District of
Columbia police force. The test, administered generally to prospective government employees, was
used to determine whether applicants had acquired a particular level of verbal skill. Plaintiffs contended
that the test bore no relationship to job performance and therefore violated equal protection because it
excluded four times as many African Americans as whites. These same police hopefuls, who had taken
this test, had grown up in the segregated school system that had existed in the District; see Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REv. 317, 369-76 (1987) (discussing the doctrine of discriminatory purpose established by the Supreme
Court in Davis). Yet the court found that the plaintiffs challenging this facially neutral state action, an
employment test, had to demonstrate that the state had acted with discriminatory purpose in order to
sustain their equal protection challenge. In reaching this conclusion the court reflected on the "central
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," which it described as "the
prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race." Davis, 426 U.S. at 239. Thus the
Court canonized a view of equal protection as connected to discrimination.
In Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), an equal protection
challenge to a refusal to rezone property to enable use for building low income housing, the Court
revisited the intent requirement and the Equal Protection Clause. The Court explained: "Determining
whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available. The impact of the official action
whether it 'bears more heavily on one race than another,' [citing Davis, 426 U.S. at 242], may provide
an important starting point." Id. at 266. The Court seemed aware here that discrimination may bear
more heavily on one race than another. What the Court failed to see was that systemic privilege also
results in a failure to equally distribute societal resources, contravening the constitutional mandate for
equal protection.
Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), involving a challenge to a veteran's
preference in employment, extended the intent requirement's development to encompass gender cases.
The Court held that a female civil service worker, passed over for numerous positions in favor of
veterans, had not suffered a civil rights violation, because no discriminatory intent had been proven.
Overwhelming evidence demonstrated that the statute had an inherently discriminatory impact on
women in the state civil service system. Dissenting, Justice Thurgood Marshall objected to the Supreme
Court's continued construction of the Equal Protection Clause as requiring proof of intent by plaintiffs
who had alleged race and gender discrimination based on the disparate impact of neutral policies and
practices. Marshall wrote "[t]hat a legislature seeks to advantage one group does not, as a matter of
logic or of common sense, exclude the possibility that it also intends to disadvantage another." Id. at
283. The kernel of Justice Marshall's idea, that neutral action may be both advantaging and
disadvantaging at the same time, is at the core of the new approach to equal protection of the laws
described in this article. The focus of these civil rights cases that engendered the intent requirement had
been alleged invidious discrimination, cases in which intent had been hard to prove to the court's
satisfaction. In these cases the court had emphasized preventing invidious discrimination as central to
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. But in addition to preventing discrimination, the equal
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language of the Fourteenth Amendment,6 although the United States Supreme
Court has held that a litigant, pursuing a claim of discrimination in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, must prove intent to discriminate.
The word "person" does appear in the amendment's language, indicating the
primacy of equal protection to individuals. But the Supreme Court's development
of equal protection jurisprudence, while seeking to retain that primacy, has ignored
the relationship of that individual person to the significant identity groups7 in which
that individual might be a member.8 This failure to recognize the individual-group
interrelation has resulted in a jurisprudence that makes no sense. It has created a
body of decisional law resulting in whites suing with impunity as their charge of
race discrimination finds ready remedy.9 Yet people of color claiming race
protection of the laws also precludes privileging on the basis of race or gender. The clause can be read
as a doctrine against white supremacy; see infra text accompanying notes 110-15.
6. Akhil Amar, Forgotten Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, Address Before the Temple
Political & Civil Rights Law Review Symposium (Nov. 14-15, 2003). See Lucinda Finley, 13 TEMP.
POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 429, 433-34 (2004) (using a method of "historically enlightened textualism"
to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment).
7. Significant identity groups have been the focus of much contemporary legal scholarship.
MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 21 (2003) [hereinafter
CHAMALLAS, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY]. Chamallas explains that the current emphasis in this literature
has moved beyond "the conventional understanding of identity as an ascribed or fixed status" and
instead focuses on "the dynamic or 'performative' dimensions of identity, specifically how an individual
presents his or her difference in a variety of settings." Id.
Iris Marion Young and Nancy Fraser have debated this concentration on identity. Fraser's
concern was that a focus on identity resulted in a neglect of material conditions in society, while Young
objected to the dichotomization of culture and economy. MARTHA R. MAHONEY, JOHN 0. CALMORE, &
STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE: PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LAW 52-53 (2003)
[hereinafter MAHONEY, CALMORE, & WILDMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE] (discussing the Fraser-Young
debate). See also, Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think about Race: Reflections on the Id, the Ego, and
Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEO. L.J. 2279 (2001) (decrying the focus of
contemporary theory away from material conditions of oppression).
8. Owen Fiss was an early proponent of the idea that the Court's equal protection jurisprudence
was too individualistic. Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHILOSOPHY AND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 107 (1976). In this landmark essay, written in the context of seeking to justify
affirmative action remedies, particularly for African Americans, Fiss urged the Court to adopt a "group
disadvantaging principle" as embodying a fuller account of social reality. Id. at 108. This essay is the
subject of a recent on-line symposium Legal Scholarship, The Origins and Fate of Antisubordination
Theory, at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/ (Aug. 2002) (last accessed Jan. 20, 2004).
9. See Martha R. Mahoney, Under-Ruling Civil Rights in Walker v. City of Mesquite, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 1309, 1309-10 (2000) (examining Walker v. City of Mesquite, 169 F. 3d 973 (5th Cir. 1999), as
a case study that exemplifies the ability of whites to sue with impunity). In Walker, the Fifth Circuit
held that white homeowners have a constitutional right not to have their neighborhoods selected on the
basis of their whiteness, as part of a scheme for remedying longstanding discrimination against black
public housing tenants. Id. at 1310 (citing Walker, 169 F. 3d at 987). According to Mahoney, the
court's version of "race neutrality" recognized white-majority neighborhoods as a natural phenomenon.
Viewing white neighborhoods as natural veiled the discriminatory practices which resulted in black-
majority neighborhoods and defended the concept of whiteness under this guise of neutrality. Id. at
1345; see also Darren Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race": The Inversion of
Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 673 (2003)
(describing a similar scenario in the election redistricting cases). He notes that the Supreme Court has
recognized the equal protection claims of white voters in such cases, despite the fact that they were not
victims of intentional discrimination and were not disenfranchised or disempowered by state action. Id.
Spring 2004] PRIVILEGE, GENDER, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
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discrimination, in a society that systemically privileges whiteness, find their pleas
unheard.' 0
While the intent requirement has been condemned as the chief obstacle to that
hearing, the Court's own inability to understand the relation of individuals, groups,
and the Equal Protection Clause surely must share some of the blame. Cognitive
and social psychological literature explains human mental processes, describing the
links between the conceptualization of individuals and groups and the interrelation
of that conceptualization with bias." Yet the Court's lack of understanding of the
individual-group interrelation has led to its failure to recognize forms of bias that
remain roadblocks to achieving equal protection of the laws. 2 These biases are
often embedded in the systemic privileging of some groups within identity
categories, such as whites within the category race or males within the category
sex. The Equal Protection Clause is broad enough to encompass claims based on
the operation of systemic privilege as well as claims based on discrimination. An
equal protection jurisprudence that examined systemic privilege would clarify the
10. "Privileged classes receive the most serious scrutiny of the equal protection claims while the
Court doubts and dismisses the equal protection claims of members of protected classes." See
Hutchinson, supra note 9, at 671.
II. Charles Lawrence, Linda Hamilton Krieger, and Ian Haney L6pez are among the pioneer legal
critics in illustrating the gap between legal decision-making and social and cognitive psychological
research; see generally Charles R. Lawrence III, supra note 5 (explaining "the need to inform the
discriminatory intent requirement with the learning of twentieth century psychology"); Linda Hamilton
Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations after Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251
(1998) (examining the implications of social cognition and social identity theory for the debate over
affirmative action and inquiring whether, absent preferential forms of affirmative action, remaining legal
and policy tools will suffice to control discrimination); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) (suggesting that a large number of biased employment decisions result not
from discriminatory motivation, but from a variety of unintentional categorization-related judgment
errors) [hereinafter Content of Our Categories]; Ian Haney L6pez, Institutional Racism: Judicial
Conduct and a New Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717 (2000) (proposing a theory of
racism to explain organizational activity that systematically harms minority groups, even though the
decisionmakers lack conscious discriminatory intent); see also JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA
AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 68-80 (1997) (describing
unconscious discrimination and automatic negative responses that tax African Americans); Gary Blasi,
Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons From Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241,
1246-66 (2002) (examining recent advances in social psychology and cognitive science that help to
explain how race and other stereotypes function in the human mind); Martha Chamallas, Deepening the
Legal Understandings of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747 (200 1)
(exploring forms of bias beyond disparate treatment and disparate impact, including forms of cognitive
bias such as devaluation and biased prototypes) [hereinafter Bias]; Deborah Hellman, Two Types of
Discrimination: The Familiar and the Forgotten, 86 CAL. L. REV. 315 (1998) (arguing that current
equal protection doctrine fails to recognize an important conceptual distinction between proxy and non-
proxy discrimination); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Gender Bias, Cognition, and Power in the Legal
Academy, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1125, 1125-28 (1999) (describing marginalization of women faculty at
MIT); Lu-in Wang, Race as Proxy: Situational Racism and Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes, 53 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1013 (2004) (describing unconscious biases that impact behavior); Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 586 (1990) (describing Funes the
magnificent and how we must categorize in order to think).
12. See, e.g., Krieger, Content of Our Categories, supra note 11, at 1174 (arguing that racial
discrimination in employment is usually unintended); Wang, supra note 11, at 4.
[Vol. 13:707
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interrelation of individuals to groups, provide an avenue for addressing biases, and
sidestep the need to prove intent to discriminate in cases involving equal protection
violations. Equal protection analysis needs to interrogate the structures of
domination that create and maintain systemic privilege rather than merely focusing
on a comparison of the treatment accorded to individuals.
Many writers have criticized the intent requirement, detailing its
incompatability with achieving the goal of ending discrimination. 3 Rather than
recreating that critique, this project seeks to chart a substitute path in equal
protection jurisprudence that avoids the intent requirement without necessitating
overruling it. This alternative path examines systemic privilege and claims that the
dismantling of privilege, in particular white privilege, is necessary to achieving the
equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 Thus it asserts
that equal protection claims should focus on privilege rather than on discrimination.
The Court's gender decisions illustrate two points relevant to this project.
First, the current focus on discrimination is inadequate as confusion about the
individual-group interrelation continues to inhibit attaining equal protection of the
laws. Second, the fact patterns in key decisions reflect the presence of systemic
privilege. The Court finds equal protection violations where systemic privilege is
present, even though the Court does not name its decision-making method within
the gender cases in this manner.
This article explains how the early gender equality cases exposed an
inconsistency in judicial reasoning about the relationship between individuals and
groups. The analysis in these cases of the harms that violate equal protection of the
laws was hampered by their over-reliance on the comparative mode of equal
protection analysis. Recent gender decisions suggest that the Court is mired in the
same inconsistency. A focus on systemic privilege can aid the Court in
surmounting this doctrinal impasse. The Court has delineated the idea of systemic
privilege in early decisional law, without naming it as such. Thus an analysis that
13. See generally Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1084-1100 (1998)
(tracing the Supreme Court's varied applications of the intent requirement); see also Hutchinson, supra
note 9, at 664 (noting that, by utilizing the intent requirement, the Court fails to recognize "subtle and
evolving" forms of discrimination); Lawrence, supra note 5 (stating that the intent requirement ignores
unconscious racism, which is the real cause of racial discrimination); Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn
Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151,
1166 (1991) (concluding that discrimination victims often decline to file discrimination claims because
of the perceived difficulty of proving discriminatory intent); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I
See": White Rate Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953,
980-81 (1993) (stating that the intent requirement ignores the existence of white race consciousness).
For a critique of the intent requirement as it applies to Title VII, see Krieger, Content of Our Categories,
supra note I I (questioning the premise that discrimination necessarily manifests intent or motive);
Chamallas, Bias, supra note I I (discussing the debate over whether "unconscious disparate treatment" is
actionable under Title VII).
14. The focus of this article is on the use of gender cases to make this argument. This article is part
of a larger project that addresses the race cases and white privilege in greater detail. This path is only
alternative in contrast to the past several decades of equal protection jurisprudence. The Court in an
earlier era described attributes of systemic privilege in the fact patterns of both Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967), see infra notes 11-18, and Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (challenging
segregated public schools as depriving children of equal protection of the laws).
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considers systemic privilege can clarify the meaning of equal protection of the
laws.
Linking gender, including the concepts of gender discrimination and privilege,
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a relatively new
jurisprudential idea. The Amendment's authors, much like the Constitution's
Framers, gave little serious thought to the idea of women as equal citizens in a
democratic society. 15 According to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Equal
Protection Clause itself was a "last resort" of constitutional arguments.16 Therefore
it is only recently that the Equal Protection Clause as it relates to gender has
generated judicial and scholarly interest.
The well-documented change began with Reed v. Reed 7 in 1971, when the
Supreme Court found an Idaho statute that preferred men as estate administrators
violated the promise of equal protection. Reed was the beginning of the evolution
of a new standard of review in equal protection cases involving gender. 8 But even
as Reed marked a new era in equal protection jurisprudence, the gender cases
demonstrated the Court's inadequate understanding of the individual-group
interrelationship and its bearing on equal protection.
In The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response to Supreme
Court Jurisprudence,9 I examined the early years of Supreme Court decisions in
which litigants alleged sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. The article traced the confusing double message delivered by the Supreme
Court decisions in which the Court asserted a desire to end sex discrimination, yet
did not resolve cases in favor of women where ending discrimination meant
mandating significant societal change. The cases in which the Court did find a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause involved what I called the "comparison
15. See Sylvia A. Law, 13 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 691, 691 (2004) ("As a matter of
original intent it is clear that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not contemplate that it
would encompass gender equality. Indeed, there is much evidence that the Framers understood that it
did not reach gender discrimination." ).
16. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
17. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that an Idaho law treating men and women differently as potential
estate administrators violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
18. Sylvia A. Law describes that standard as "functionally equivalent to that applied to racial
classifications." Law, supra note 15, at 695. However, equivalence was not the Court's intent. See
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1972) (discussing
the Court's failure to establish gender as a suspect class paralleling its treatment of race, but describing
the Court as using a standard of scrutiny that seemed somewhat more exacting than rational basis). But
in contemplating the desirability of a uniform standard of review, it is worth remembering Justice
Stevens admonishment:
There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every state to govern impartially. It
does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in some cases and a different
standard in other cases. Whatever criticism may be leveled at judicial opinion that there are
at least three such standards applies with the same force to a double standard.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Stevens, J. concurring). See also Heather L. Stobaugh, The
Aftermath of United States v. Virginia: Why Five Justices Are Pulling in the Reins on the "Exceedingly
Persuasive Justification, '" 55 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1756-58 (2002) (contending that Nguyen v. INS, 533
U.S. 53 (2001), marked a retreat from heightened scrutiny of gender-based classifications).
19. 63 OR. L. REV. 265 (1984).
[Vol. 13:707
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mode."20 Comparison mode cases involved a claim of sex discrimination, often by
a man, whom the Court compared to a woman in a similar situation. The Court
found similar situations to be present where individual actors were easy to identify,
for example in cases relating to the receipt of benefits2' or the purchase of "near
beer."22 In these cases, the Court could evaluate treatment of an individual man by
examining the corresponding treatment of an individual woman. Cases that seemed
to confound the Court involved women claiming discrimination in situations unlike
any men faced. Where a woman's experience could not be compared to a man's,
such as pregnancy, or in situations women faced disproportionately to men, such as
veteran's preference or rape, the Court could not perceive an equality violation.23
That article urged a "participatory perspective" in reviewing equal protection
claims, stating that "any stigmatizing conduct which inhibits the full participation
of women in society" should be held to violate the Equal Protection Clause.24 The
idea of a participatory perspective sought to emphasize that ensuring equal
participation in democracy was a core component of equal protection of the law
and the Fourteenth Amendment.25
At the same time, Sylvia A. Law, in Rethinking Sex and the Constitution,2 6
argued that an equality doctrine that denies the reality of biological difference in
relation to reproduction reflected an idea about personhood that is inconsistent with
people's actual experience of themselves and the world. That article also traced the
confusing messages from the Supreme Court regarding the Court's view of gender,
especially in cases relating to biological difference. 27  Biological difference
20. Id. at 270-72.
21. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 152 (1980) (denial of death benefits
to widowers without proof of dependency violated equal protection); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977) (denial of social security benefits to a surviving husband who could not prove dependency
violated equal protection); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975) (denial of social
security survivor's benefits to widower who had been primary caretaker of children violated equal
protection).
22. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (state statutes prohibiting the sale of low-alcohol content
beer to males between the ages of 18 and 20, but allowing its sale to females of the same age,
discriminated on the basis of gender and were therefore unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause).
23. See Elizabeth Schneider, The Synergy of Equality and Privacy in Women's Rights, 2002 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 137, 145-52 (2002) (arguing that the concepts of privacy and equality are informed by each
other and should be examined together in women's rights cases).
24. See WILDMAN, supra note 19, at 268.
25. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term Foreword. Equal Citizenship Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5-11 (1977) (discussing equal citizenship as a legal and
ideological concept); Kenneth L. Karst, Sources of Status-Harm and Group Disadvantage in Private
Behavior, in ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, THE ORIGINS AND FATE OF ANTI-SUBORDINATION
THEORY: Article 4, 10-22 (Aug. 2002) (discussing the "group disadvantaging principle" in terms of sex
equality and sexual orientation equality), at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art4 (accessed Feb. 28,
2004).
26. 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984).
27. Law states:
Present constitutional equality doctrine does not encompass concern with laws that regulate
real biological difference. This failure has undermined strong equality analysis in cases
challenging explicit sex-based classifications. The Craig standard, condemning explicit sex
based classifications based on inaccurate stereotypical views of men and women, collapses
Spring 2004]
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presented situations in which the comparison between women and men,
necessitated by the comparison mode of equal protection review, prevented the
Court from comprehending the equality violation.2"
Both of these early articles saw an inconsistency in the Supreme Court's
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence relating to gender. In cases not implicating
biological difference, cases in which a comparison between women and men
demonstrated two individuals receiving different treatment, the Court was able to
perceive the presence of sex discrimination. But in cases involving any biological
difference between women and men, the Court seemed unable to view the problem
as impinging on the equal protection of the laws. So, for example, the Court
decided Roe v. Wade,29 the challenge to the criminalization of abortion, on privacy
grounds, not on the basis of an equality violation. Similarly, the Court found no
equal protection violation in Michael M v. Sonoma County,3" involving a statutory
rape law that criminalized only male conduct.
Gender jurisprudence has evolved since those judicial decisions. The Court
has recognized the harm of sexual harassment3 and found sex discrimination in
when applied to explicit sex-based classifications that are arguably related to real biological
differences.
Id. at 988.
Both articles explain that male plaintiffs claiming sex discrimination fared better than female
plaintiffs. Law also points out that the Court decided recent cases of sex discrimination, arguably
dealing with reproductive biology, brought by men without any regard to biological differences. Id; see
also Wildman, supra note 19, at 299, stating:
Ironically, most cases in which the Court has combated sex discrimination by striking down
gender-based classifications have involved discrimination against men. As a result of the
decision in Califano v. Goldfarb, a man could now get AFDC survivor benefits; in Caban, a
father of an illegitimate child could now block an adoption; in Orr, men have won the right
to receive alimony from women; in Wengler, a man became entitled to receive workers
compensation death benefits when his spouse died; and in Hogan, a man could attend a
previously all-female graduate nursing program.
28. The need for making a comparison between women and men under equal protection theory led
to a debate about the meaning of equality. This debate, often characterized as between "equal
treatment" or "special treatment," surfaced in cases involving pregnancy. Martha Chamallas,
summarizing this debate observed "both camps renounced the male norm and disagreed as much about
strategy as fundamental theory." CHAMALLAS, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 7, at 43. See id at 39-44
for a description of this debate.
29. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a woman's right to have an abortion is within the scope of
personal liberty guaranteed by the constitutional right to privacy).
30. 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (holding that statutory rape law, which only made men criminally liable for
having sexual intercourse with women under the age of 18, and not vice versa, did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was sufficiently related to the state's interest
in preventing teenage pregnancy).
31. The Supreme Court first recognized sexual harassment as a violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-68
(1986) (providing that a claim of "hostile work environment" is a form of sex discrimination actionable
under Title VII). Subsequent sexual harassment cases decided by the Court include: Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (finding that a plaintiff can bring a sexual harassment claim without
necessarily showing psychological harm); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75,
81-82 (1998) (holding that harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an
inference of discrimination on the basis of sex); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-808
(1998) (concluding that an employer is subject to vicarious liability for a hostile environment created by
[Vol. 13:707714
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cases involving the workplace.3 2 The workplace setting has been the context in
which the Court has been most able to perceive both a need for equal access and the
history of differential treatment of women as a group. Thus it is in the workplace
context that equality claims based on allegations of discrimination have been most
effective. Hindsight makes clear that the easy cases for the Court, in equal
protection analysis, involved an individual woman treated differently from an
individual man.33
Two recent cases, United States v. Morrison4 and Nevada Department of
Human Resources v. Hibbs,35 suggest that the Court still faces the same myopia,
stemming from the use of the comparison mode and the failure to understand the
individual-group interrelation, about how to analyze gender cases involving
equality. While the Court does seem better able to comprehend gender inequality
in the workplace, viewing women and men as potentially co-equal actors in that
setting like Hibbs, the Court still fails to see a violation of equal protection in
situations where women and men cannot be easily compared. That was the
situation in Morrison where the record indicated overwhelming evidence of
violence against women.
In Morrison, the Court struck the portion of the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA) that created a private right of action for women who had been the victim
of male violence.36 In Hibbs, the Court upheld the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) 37 which allows employees a total of twelve weeks of unpaid leave to care
for immediate family members.3" Both cases involved the question whether
a supervisor, unless the employer can show that he exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct any
sexually harassing behavior and that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
preventive or corrective measures); Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765-66 (1998)
(determining that an employer is subject to vicarious liability for an actionable hostile work environment
created by a supervisor with authority).
32. See United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 198-201 (1990) (holding that an
employer's fetal-protection policy explicitly discriminated against women on the basis of their sex). See
also Johnson v. Transp. Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 631-32 (1987) (holding that it is
not a violation of Title VII for a public agency to take sex into account as one factor when making
promotions in jobs in which women were significantly underrepresented); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that it is sex discrimination to require a female candidate for partnership in
an accounting firm to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely and wear
make-up").
33. In the workplace the differential treatment of an individual woman often corresponded with
differential treatment of women, as a group. Thus, while not recognizing systemic privilege in the
workplace, the Court found arguments of equal protection violations compelling in the presence of
privilege. See STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN with contributions by MARGALYNNE ARMSTRONG, ADRIENNE
D. DAVIS, & TR1NA GRILLO, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES
AMERICA 25-41 (1996) [hereinafter PRIVILEGE REVEALED] for a discussion of privilege in the
workplace.
34. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
35. 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003).
36. The Court struck 42 U.S.C. § 13981, which provided a civil remedy for victims of gender-
motivated violence, as unconstitutional on the ground that Congress lacked authority to enact the statute
under either its Commerce Clause or Section Five power. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601-02.
37. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1976; Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 2612(a)(1)(C)(Lexis
1993).
38. See Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (Lexis 1993).
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Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress to redress a
substantive violation of constitutional equality norms. Yet the fact patterns upon
which the decisions were based reveal the inadequacy of a focus on discrimination
in the contexts that gave rise to the litigation. The contexts underlying these cases
demonstrate the Court's continuing myopia about equality. The call to examine
context in litigation, long a backbone of common law jurisprudence as well as this
Symposium, has been emphasized by a widely varied audience, including critical
race scholar John 0. Calmore,39 feminist theorist Reva Siegel,4" and Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor.41 This examination of context reveals the operation of systemic
male privilege. The recognition of unnamed privilege could lead the Court out of
its equality predicament.
Morrison considered the claim of Ms. Christy Brzonkala, a student at Virginia
Polytechnic Institute, who was repeatedly raped and assaulted by two male students
within thirty minutes of their meeting. 42  She pursued her remedy through the
campus sexual assault policy, but this effort resulted in no punishment of her
attackers.43 Ms. Brzonkala dropped out of school and later sued under the Violence
Against Women Act."
Morrison marks a continuation of the Court's assault on Congressional
authority.45 At issue was Section 13981 of the Violence against Women Act
39. John 0. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at the
Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927, 1927 (1999).
40. Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the
Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 948-49 (2002).
41. Justice O'Connor wrote:
Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection
Clause .... [n]ot every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable and strict
scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the importance and the
sincerity of the reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in
that particular context.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338 (citations omitted).
42. 529 U.S. at 602.
43. Id. at 603.
44. Id. at 603-04.
45. See MAHONEY, CALMORE, & WILDMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 726-65; United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (limiting congressional power under the Commerce Clause). For
other Court decisions limiting congressional power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment,
see Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garret, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (holding that suits by state
employees are barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67
(2000) (holding that the Age Discrimination Employment Act's abrogation of state immunity exceeds
Congress' power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 511 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 exceeds Congress'
power). See also Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation after Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 444 (2000) [hereinafter
Post & Siegel, Equal Protection] (analyzing Congress' Section Five power within the terms of these
decisions, questioning the court-centered model of constitutional interpretations assumed by them, and
examining the relationship between courts and Congress that has shaped the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People:
Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (2003) (discussing the implications of
the Court's recent decisions invalidating federal civil rights legislation enacted under Congress' Section
Five power); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power:
TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:707
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(VAWA), which created a federal civil remedy for gender-motivated violence. The
Court found Congress had exceeded its authority under either the Commerce
Clause or under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting Section
13981.46
Rejecting the Commerce Clause-based argument that Congress had authority
to address gender-motivated violence, the Court relied upon the decision in United
States v. Lopez,47 which held that Congress lacked power to adopt the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990.48 That act made it a federal crime "knowingly to
possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to
believe, is a school zone. '49 Following the Lopez reasoning, the Court emphasized
the noneconomic, criminal nature of the conduct that Congress sought to regulate.
The court rejected arguments about the "costs of crime" and "national productivity"
for fear that Congressional power would be too expansive, obliterating any
distinction between federal and local authority.5" Ultimately the Court concluded
that the harm targeted by Section 13981, violence against women, was too
attenuated from commerce to warrant exercise of Congressional power on that
basis. Yet, in Ms. Brzonkala's case the violence against her was tragically
economic-she dropped out of school.
The dismissal of the Commerce Clause argument trivializes the harm to
women that results from the prevalence of gendered violence. Martha Mahoney
uses this teaching exercise to highlight the economic nature of the conduct
Congress sought to regulate. She asks male students, "How much time do you
spend avoiding being raped?" Avoiding rape has no impact on male students time
commitments. She asks women students, "How much money do you spend
avoiding being raped?" The women students generate an extensive list of costs,
with items ranging in price from a few cents to hundreds of dollars each month.
Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1945 (2003)
(arguing that Section Five is a structural device that fosters the democratic legitimacy of constitutional
order, as it provides a voice for the American people, as expressed through their chosen representatives).
46. For a critique of the Court's analysis in Morrison, see Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra
note 45, at 441-43. See also Catherine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United States v.
Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135, 135, 139 (2000) (urging that the Court failed to realize that violence
against women does indeed have economic impact, leading them to leave women completely out of their
analysis of the Violence Against Women Act); Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, The Violence
Against Women Act, and the Use and Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 61 (2002) (arguing
that the VAWA civil rights provision was a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and examining Morrison's detrimental implications for
federalism); Jennifer R. Johnson, Comment: Privileged Justice Under Law: Reinforcement of Male
Privilege by the Federal Judiciary Through the Lens of the Violence Against Women Act and U.S. v.
Morrison, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1399, 1402 (2003) (analyzing the occurrence and reinforcement of
male privilege and gender discrimination in the federal court system and suggesting Commerce Clause
based legislation compelling the federal judiciary to avoid reinforcing gender discrimination through the
courts).
47. 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
48. Id. at 551.
49. 18 U.S.C.S. § 992(q)(2)(A) (Lexis 1990).
50. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article
111, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 1003-04 (2000) (chronicling the Court's concern that federal jurisdiction
would be too expansive, generating a greater workload for judges).
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The women students mentioned costs such as unlisted phones, cell phones, gated
communities, self-defense classes, gym membership (to avoid jogging or working
out in public spaces), cars rather than public transportation, and residing on rather
than off campus. Morrison, though recognizing the cost of rape, does not identify
the cost of avoiding rape.
It is in this cost of avoiding rape that both the Commerce Clause and
Fourteenth Amendment aspects of the case are linked. As to Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court appeared unpersuaded by the extensive evidence
introduced into the Congressional record as to the pervasiveness of violence against
women. The Court's reasoning seemed to fault Congress for not targeting more
narrow state action,5' almost as if the prevalence of violence against women meant
that violence could not be remedied under the Fourteenth Amendment. But the
avoidance of rape impacts women's commercial activity on a daily basis. Because
males do not incur that avoidance cost nor change their behaviors, women's
avoidance conduct is unnoticed. Men are privileged in relation to activity required
to avoid rape in a culture where rape is both prevalent and largely unpunished.52
Maleness and male behavior is the dominant norm, a behavior in which individuals
do not spend time thinking about avoiding rape. But this behavior is not gender
neutral: not thinking about rape avoidance is male behavior. The behavior of
individual men and women, their differential responses to the avoidance costs, is
linked to their membership in the group "women" or the group "men".
The states are actors in this dynamic because rape laws are so ineffective.
5 3
Thus Congress, acting under its Section Five power, sought to create a remedy to
compensate women for the equal protection violation. By creating Section 13981,
Congress followed the Court's articulation of the Equal Protection Clause,
recognizing sex as a category where an exceedingly persuasive justification must
be demonstrated for government conduct. States' conduct in relation to rape,
devoid of such justification, has created this disparity in treatment based on sex.
Rehnquist's opinion in Morrison concluded by stating that if the allegations
were true, "no civilized system of justice could fail to provide [Brzonkala] a
51. In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:
The reasoning that petitioners advance seeks to follow the but-for causal chain from the
initial occurrence of violent crime ... to every attenuated effect upon interstate commerce. If
accepted, petitioners' reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as the
nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment,
production, transit, or consumption. Indeed, if Congress may regulate gender-motivated
violence, it would be able to regulate murder or any other type of violence since gender-
motivated violence, as a subset of all violent crime, is certain to have lesser economic
impacts than the larger class of which it is a part.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
52. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 146 (1989)
(discussing "rape's pervasiveness and permissibility, together with the belief that it is both rare and
impermissible.").
53. For a discussion of the invisibility of the state as actor in other contexts, see Kenneth M.
Casebeer, The Empty State and Nobody's Market: The Political Economy of Non-Responsibility and the
Judicial Disappearing of the Civil Rights Movement, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 247, 250 (2000) (suggesting
that the Rehnquist Court has changed the role of the judge from non-partisan interpreter of the
Constitution to that of a political activist).
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remedy... . But under our federal system that remedy must be provided by the
Commonwealth of Virginia .... -14 Yet Congress had reviewed the difficulties that
rape victims found in bringing successful rape claims in state courts. Prosecutors
might be reluctant to file charges. State laws on consent and past sexual conduct
could be further obstacles, resulting in rape victims being traumatized a second
time in court proceedings. The so-called civilized state justice systems fail to
provide a remedy in the majority of rape cases. As the dissent noted, citing
Congressional findings: "'An individual who commits rape has only about 4
chances in 100 of being arrested, prosecuted, and found guilty of any offense.'...
'Almost one-quarter of convicted rapists never go to prison and another quarter
received sentences in local jails where the average sentence is 11 months."' 55 As
these facts illustrate, although rape is a crime "on the books," the widespread
freedom men have to engage in that conduct unpunished means rape is in effect
sanctioned.16
Significantly absent from the Court's discussion of Section Five was any
evidence that the Court saw a connection between the prevalence and sanctioning
of rape and an equal protection harm to women. Robert Post and Reva Siegel
characterize the decision as a failure of the Court to see Section 13981 as an
antidiscrimination statute. 7 But that failure represents an example of why a focus
on discrimination cannot adequately protect women from equal protection
violations. The Court was unable to utilize a comparison mode, comparing the
treatment of a woman to that of a man, in this fact pattern. Women, as a group, are
threatened by rape in a way that men are not. It is an individual's membership in
the group "women," not her individual identity, that makes her a target. This
decision exposes the poverty of the comparison mode and the consequences of the
Court's failure to grasp the individual-group interrelation.
The Court seems more able to grasp the individual-group interrelation where
an individual man is harmed by stereotypic views of the group "males." Hibbs
involved a suit against the state of Nevada for alleged violations of the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA).55 William Hibbs, the respondent in the
Supreme Court, had sought leave from his employment at the state's Department of
Human Resources in order to care for his ailing wife. He requested both paid
"catastrophic leave" and unpaid leave under the FMLA.59 His employer informed
54. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
55. Id. at 633-34.
56. As Catharine MacKinnon has explained, "the systemic failure of the state to enforce the rape
law effectively or at all excludes women from equal access to justice, permitting women to be savaged
on a mass scale, depriving them of equal protection and equal benefit of the laws." MACKINNON, supra
note 52, at 245-46. The Court's failure to acknowledge Brzonkala's claim suggests either a failure to
recognize the significance of the issue, a failure to respect Congressional judgment, or both. For a
discussion of the Court's view of itself in relation to Congressional decisionmaking, see Bradley W.
Joondeph, Bush v. Gore, Federalism, and the Distrust of Politics, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1781, 1781 (2001)
(emphasizing the role of Court in deciding questions of constitutional meaning).
57. Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 45, at 524-25.
58. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972. See also Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 2612(a)(1)(C)
(entitling eligible employees to take up to twelve work weeks of unpaid leave per twelve working
months for the onset of a "serious health condition" in the employee's spouse).
59. Hibbs v. HDM Dept. of Human Resources, 273 F.3d 844, 848-49 (9th Cir. 2001).
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him that his paid leave would be counted against the twelve weeks of unpaid leave
allowed by the FMLA.60 Hibbs pursued his grievance avenues, believing that "his
unpaid FMLA leave should begin to run after his paid catastrophic leave ended, not
concurrently with it."'6' He ultimately filed suit in the federal district court.62 The
district court held that the claim was barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which
provides immunity to states from suits by private parties unless that immunity is
validly abrogated or expressly waived.
63
In Hibbs, the Court dismissed any concern over whether Congress had been
"unmistakably clear" 64 in the statutory language expressing the intent to abrogate
the states' immunity from suit. The Court then turned to consider Congress's
constitutional authority to do so. Examining the FMLA in the context of
employment, the Court noted that it: "aims to protect the right to be free from
gender-based discrimination in the workplace. '65 The Court traced problems
women have faced in the workplace related to leave policies, including stereotypes
about women's appropriate domestic role and "parallel stereotypes presuming a
lack of domestic responsibilities for men. '66 Quoting Congressional findings, the
Court observed:
Historically, denial or curtailment of women's employment opportunities
has been traceable directly to the pervasive presumption that women are
mothers first, and workers second. This prevailing ideology about
women's roles has in turn justified discrimination against women when
they are mothers or mothers-to-be.67
The Court noted that these stereotypes are mutually reinforcing, perpetuating a
cycle that forces women to continue acting as primary family caregivers, thereby
perpetuating employer attitudes which question not only women's commitment to
their work, but also their actual value as employees. 6 The Court acknowledged
that these perceptions "lead to subtle discrimination that may be difficult to detect
on a case-by-case basis. '69 The Court further observed the weighty "record of
unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, gender-based discrimination in
60. Id.
61. Id. at 849.
62. The FMLA creates a private right of action to seek both equitable relief and money damages
against "any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent
jurisdiction." 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2). This right of action may be invoked should the employer
"interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of' rights provided for under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. §
2615(a)(1).
63. Hibbs, 273 F.3d at 850.
64. Congress may, however, abrogate such immunity in federal court if it makes its intention to
abrogate unmistakably clear in the language of the statute and acts pursuant to a valid exercise of its
power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1977 (citing Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976)).
65. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1978.
66. Id. at 1982.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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the administration of leave benefits"70 by the states. The Court concluded that
Congress was justified in enacting the FMLA as remedial legislation.7'
Thus in Hibbs, a case brought in the workplace context, the Court could
perceive women and men as part of groups receiving treatment based on biased
stereotypes. Perhaps the fact that the individual plaintiff was a man brought the
presence of these stereotypes into stark relief. Male plaintiffs' claims for equality
violations have fared well.72
In reaching the conclusion that the Congressional action enacting the FMLA
was justified, the Court contrasted the Hibbs facts with the holdings in Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett73 and Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents,74 in which the Court found Congress's statutory enactments to have
exceeded the scope of Congressional authority. What is shocking about the Court's
opinion in Hibbs is its failure to even mention Morrison, where the Court had also
found Congress had exceeded its authority in passing the Violence Against Women
Act.75
Can the Court's holdings in Morrison and Hibbs be reconciled? These cases
evidence an ongoing ambivalence toward equality by the Court. In Hibbs, the
Court exhibited an understanding of systemic privilege as evidenced by stereotypes
in the workplace context.76 Yet the Court failed to see that same privilege in
70. Id.
71. 123 S. Ct. at 1981.
72. See MARY E. BECKER, CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, AND N. MORRISON TORREY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 81 (1994) (questioning whether
one should be "troubled by the fact that so many of the sex equality cases have been brought by men"
and noting "[o]f the 16 cases in which a sex-based equal protection argument won, the person making
the argument was a man in most (9) cases"); see also Wildman, supra note 19, at 295-300 (discussing
the early Supreme Court decisions addressing sex discrimination as an equal protection claim).
73. 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). Patricia Garrett, a nurse at the University of Alabama, was diagnosed
with breast cancer, took four months of leave, and was subsequently demoted, receiving a significantly
lower salary than she had received before her diagnosis. Id. at 362. The Court considered whether an
employee of the state may sue the state for monetary damages under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (ADA). Id. at 360. The majority found that state workers were barred by the
Eleventh Amendment from filing employment-discrimination suits against their employers under the
ADA because Congress did not validly abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment right to sovereign
immunity. Id. at 379 n.9. In enacting the ADA, Congress did not identify a pattern of irrational state
discrimination against disabled state workers sufficient to justify overriding Eleventh amendment
immunity. Id. at 374.
74. 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000). Kimel and other faculty members at Florida State University and
Florida International University were passed over for a pay raise in favor of their younger counterparts.
Id. at 69. He filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34
(ADEA). Id. The Court considered whether a clear statement of Congressional intent to abrogate a
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity appeared in the statute, and if so, whether the ADEA was a
proper exercise of Congress' constitutional authority. Id. at 71-72. The Court concluded that the ADEA
indeed contained a clear statement of Congress' intent to abrogate a state's immunity, but that the
abrogation exceeded Congressional authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at
73, 83.
75. See Law, supra note 15, at 701 (discussing the Hibbs decision and the Court's "selective
empathy for gender discrimination claims").
76. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1978 n.2 (stating that primary family caretaking responsibility falls on
women more often than men, thus affecting women's working life more than that of men).
HeinOnline  -- 13 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 721 2003-2004
operation outside that workplace setting, in Morrison, where biological difference
was implicated by the act of rape. 7 The failure of states to enforce rape laws
privileged maleness; this effective sanctioning of rape led Congress to pass VAWA
in the first place.7 8 As such these decisions reprised the same kind of split that had
confused the Court in the beginning of its journey into gender and the Fourteenth
Amendment. In Hibbs the Court understood the potential for gender discrimination
in the workplace because of bias that privileged maleness.7 9 The Court could object
to that bias by upholding the creation of the FMLA. That statute, couched in
neutral terms, treated women and men the same with respect to family and medical
leave, and allowed a comparison between women and men. But the Court was
unable to see Morrison as a case about gender and an equal protection violation,
even in the face of overwhelming Congressional findings about violence against
women. Where an outcome treating women and men the same as a result of a
comparison was not a possible solution, the Court failed to connect the disparate
treatment of women to a failure of equality.
Can a focus on privilege help the Court out of this doctrinal impasse? A focus
on systemic privilege rather than discrimination could help the Court to understand
the nature of an equal protection violation in those circumstances that do not invite
an easy comparison. A focus on ending discrimination attacks only one portion of
the system of privilege and subordination that makes maintenance of the status quo
of gender hierarchy possible. Equality is not achievable without dismantling
structural systems of privilege."° Viewing the harm through a privilege lens can
77. Men, not only women, may be raped. However, most rapes are committed on women. See, e.g.,
Mustafa K. Kasubhai, Destabilizing Power In Rape: Why Consent Theory in Rape Law is Turned on Its
Head, II WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 37, 53 n.72 (1996) ("Rape overwhelmingly involves male perpetrators
and female victims"). The idea of rape most often connotes the rape of a woman by a man.
78. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 653-54. Congress cannot interpret the Constitution more expansively
than the Court does: only the judicial branch may "say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
137, 177 (1803). Conversely, under Section Five, Congress only has the power to "enforce" provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment, not to create new substantial rights. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 519 (1997).
Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been
given the power "to enforce," not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional
violation. Were it not so, what Congress would be enforcing would no longer be, in any
meaningful sense, the "provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment]."
Id. But it is the Court that has determined that classifications based on gender require heightened
scrutiny. See supra text accompanying notes 17-33. Thus, Congressional action to remedy gender
inequality would not create a new right.
79. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1991.
80. As Adrienne Davis has noted, subordination and privilege are like twin heads of a Hydra, whose
heads grow back unless all heads are slain. PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 33, at 19-20. Brave
antidiscrimination advocates bravely attack the subordination head, which keeps growing back as long
as systemic privilege is ignored. Id. A rich literature describing white privilege continues to develop.
See, e.g., MAURICE BERGER, WHITE LIES: RACE AND THE MYTHS OF WHITENESS 164-68 (1999)
(comparing white people's failure to acknowledge the privilege that society confers on them due to their
skin color with Black people's continued recognition of the lower status society gives them because of
their skin color); David Wellman, Minstrel Shows, Affirmative Action Talk, and Angry White Men:
Marking Racial Otherness in the 1990s, in DISPLACING WHITENESS: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
CRITIcIsM 311-31 (Ruth Frankenberg, ed., Duke University Press 1997) (discussing the persistence of
white male advantage from the 1980s through the 1990s); BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT Now I
TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:707
HeinOnline  -- 13 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 722 2003-2004
PRIVILEGE, GENDER, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
help litigators better explain to the Court the nature of the equal protection
violation.
So what is privilege? As I have explained, privilege is a "systemic conferral
of benefit and advantage," resulting from "affiliation, conscious or not and chosen
or not, to the dominant side of a power system."'" Unlike liberal legalism which
posits all individuals as equal, an acknowledgment of systems of privilege
recognizes that individuals are members of groups, which are situated differently in
relation to power.8 2 "Affiliation with the dominant side of the power line is often
defined as merit and worthiness. Characteristics and behaviors shared by those on
the dominant side of the power line often delineate the societal norm"83 or standard.
In the context of gender, male privilege enables the holder to avoid the
consequences of male power and choose whether even to combat that form of
oppression.1
4
Privilege may seem easy to identify from this explanation, but several aspects
of privilege make it hard to capture in words. One difficulty in defining privilege
stems from the interaction of multiple systems of privilege. Identity categories like
race and sexual orientation, status categories like class and law graduate, and other
aspects of personhood all intertwine with gender so that each individual possesses
SEE: WHITE RACE CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE REQUIREMENT OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT (1998)
(discussing the tendency of white people to impose white norms on Blacks, requiring assimilation rather
than accepting cultural pluralism); RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS (1997) (analyzing white cultural dominance over other cultures);
GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: How WHITE PEOPLE PROFIT FROM
IDENTITY POLITICS 24-42 (1998) (describing how whiteness continues to be a privilege through poorly
structured anti-discrimination laws and bad faith enforcement of them, including the areas of fair
housing, school desegregation, and employment discrimination); THOMAS ROSS, JUST STORIES: How
THE LAW EMBODIES RACISM AND BIAS 52-56 (1996) (describing the continuing existence of
unconscious racism through the depictions of Black people in television and movies and the growing
mentality among white people that white people today are innocent of racism and victimized by
affirmative action). See also Barbara J. Flagg, Was Blind, But Now I See: White Race Consciousness
and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957 (1993) (asking white readers
to reexamine customary ways of thinking about whiteness); Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation,
Whiteness and Transformation, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1659 (1995) (arguing that segregation reflects and
reinforces socially-created concepts of blackness and whiteness); Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and
Remedy: Under-Ruling Civil Rights in Walker v. City of Mesquite, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1309 (2000)
(criticizing a trend in recent cases protecting white plaintiffs and arguing that courts must not develop
rules that protect whiteness as a concern in ensuring that race-conscious remedies for racial
discrimination be narrowly tailored); Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, In Practice and
Theory: A Reply to Catharine MacKinnon, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 217 (1993) (examining white
privilege and gender oppression).
81. PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 33, at 29.
82. The power line divides those privileged from those not privileged based on socially significant
identity categories. PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 33, at 29. "[P]eople situated differently in
relation to the power line have very disparate experiences of daily reality. For example, walking into a
bank to cash a check may be a racial experience for people of color who face requests for extra
identification and even curious stares, while their white counterparts do not." Id. at 173.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 16. "Depending on the number of privileges someone has, she or he may experience the
power of choosing the types of struggles in which to engage." Id.
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aspects of both privilege and non-privilege as part of his or her identity. 5 So one
aspect of systemic privilege is that systems of privilege interact with each other,
creating a non-static, context-based target, and language, grounded in the
permanent, fights the possibility of description.86
Another problem in trying to talk about privilege, identified by john powell, is
that no word exists for "not privileged." The absence of "vocabulary limits
dialogue and action."87 Language does not provide an easy word to capture the
person who is not privileged. The opposite of privileged or "not privileged" is not
"discriminated against." Thus the jurisprudential focus on discrimination has
meant that the larger landscape of equal protection violations relating to "not
privileged" remains unnoticed and unaddressed by law.
Understanding privilege requires thinking about individuals as part of
groups.8 As powell explains, "our personal relationships are mediated through
power and institutional structures; privilege cannot be addressed at only the
85. Recently, writers have tried to illuminate the complexity of intersecting strands of privilege. See
Kimberld W. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 139
(contrasting the multidimensionality of black women's experiences with the "single-axis analysis"
which distorts them and arguing that feminism must include race analysis to meet the needs of all
women). The intersecting strands of privilege may be likened to a Koosh ball. Each strand is present,
but the shape changes, depending how one looks at the ball, or whether it is tossed in the air. This
metaphor suggests the interlocking nature of systems of privilege. What they create is greater than the
sum of their parts in how they affect communities. These privileging dynamics, which are often
unspoken or hard to label, affect the potential for creating community. For a discussion of the Koosh
ball metaphor, see PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 33, at 22-24. See also Darren Lenard Hutchinson,
Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics,
47 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 2 (1999) (arguing that many anti-racist scholars often exhibit a misunderstanding of
the relationship between racial oppression and other forms of subordination, particularly heterosexism
and patriarchy, and that they often perpetuate heterosexism and marginalize gay, lesbian, bisexual and
transgendered people of color in their work); Peter Kwan, Bridging Divides: A Challenge to Unify Anti-
Subordination: Complicity and Complexity: Cosynthesis and Praxis, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 684
(2000) (arguing that societies must rethink notions of ethnic identity in terms of cultural, class and
gender differences, rather than presume similarities); Devon W. Carbado, Straight Out of the Closet, 15
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 76, 79 (2000) (arguing that, in light of the everyday ways in which men,
especially heterosexual men, experience gender privileges, men should take on a feminist political
ideology, and work towards ameliorating gender subordination of women).
86. PRIVILEGE REVEALED, supra note 33, at 22-24 uses the metaphor of a koosh ball to suggest the
changing interactions of systems of privilege:
The Koosh ball is a popular children's toy. Although it is called a ball and that category
leads one to imagine a firm, round object used for catching and throwing, the Koosh ball is
neither hard nor firm. Picture hundreds of rubber bands, tied in the center. Mentally cut the
end of each band. The wriggling, unfirm mass in your hand is a Koosh ball, still usable for
throwing and catching, but changing shape as it sails through the air or as the wind blows
through its rubbery limbs when it is at rest. It is a dynamic ball.
Id. at 22-23.
87. See john a. powell, Whites Will Be Whites: The Failure to Interrogate Racial Privilege, 34
U.S.F. L. REV. 419, 422 (2000) (stating that the dictionary does not contain the word "aprivilege" or
"nonprivilege").
88. Id. at 449 (criticizing court decisions that "decontextualiz[e] people and groups of people,
portraying them as self-created individuals who live outside of any social, historical, or political
context").
[Vol. 13:707
HeinOnline  -- 13 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 724 2003-2004
personal level."8 9 Yet the interrelation of individuals and groups within traditional
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and scholarship has been complicated and
confusing. Schizophrenia about individuals and groups characterizes legal
liberalism, where the focus shifts from individuals to groups and back again almost
as if by sleight of hand.90 Rights, such as the right to remain silent or the right to
speak freely, inure to individual actors. The Court's focus on discrimination as
embodying the meaning of equal protection further emphasizes the individual actor,
both as an evil perpetrator of discrimination and as the innocent victim of that
harm.9
But individuals are harmed by discrimination both in their status as individuals
and because they are members of a targeted group. This group membership is
acknowledged by anti-discrimination laws, which protect the individual from
discrimination, when that individual is a member of a specific, named, identity
group. Title VII names as protected categories race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin.92 So, for example, an employment discrimination law says an
employer may not discriminate against an individual man, based on race, because
he is a member of the group "African Americans" or against an individual woman,
based on sex, because she is part of the group "women." When a restaurant refuses
service to an African American man, that refusal is made because of that
individual's group membership, not because the restaurant knows anything
personal about the individual.93
This clash between individuals and groups is exacerbated by the central
tension of the Equal Protection Clause. Early commentators on the equal
protection doctrine, Joseph Tussman and Jacobus TenBroek discussed the dilemma
of the Equal Protection Clause as requiring treating likes alike, but permitting
classification made by law.94 Tussman and TenBroek articulated the meaning of
the clause as requiring equal treatment for those similarly situated, but society has
privileged women and men quite differently. Differential privileging means by
definition that women and men cannot have been similarly situated. Women and
89. powell, supra note 87, at 444 (citing IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF
DIFFERENCE (1990)).
90. One exception may be found in scholarship related to voting, which has advocated the need to
recognize the individual-group interrelationship. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: A
Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1269, 1277 (2002) (stating that "practical politics is not a
story of isolated individuals casting votes independently from one another but, rather, the mobilization
of groups."); Lani Guinier, More Democracy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 6-7 (proposing "a framework
for democracy which does not see democratic participation purely and exclusively as a matter of
individuals, but respects and acknowledges the role that groups and group participation play in
organizing the way people think about their public roles.").
91. Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Anti-Discrimination Law: A Critical
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1978) (describing the perpetrator
perspective that governs anti-discrimination law).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2).
93. See JIM ADAMSON, THE DENNY'S STORY: HOW A COMPANY IN CRISIS RESURRECTED ITS GOOD
NAME AND REPUTATION 17-18, 47-60 (2000) (describing the implementation of the consent decree
levied as part of the $54 million race discrimination class action against Denny's Restaurants).
94. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341
(1949).
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men's status as members of their identity groups has impacted their functioning in
society. Understanding this difference and its impact on the aspiration for equal
protection implicates the concept of systemic privilege.
In the gender realm, privilege is most understandable through Marilyn Frye's
observation that when a child is born, the common question asked is, "Is it a boy or
a girl?"95  The necessity of asking this question reflects society's difficulty in
relating to individuals without knowing to which identity group to assign them,
within the gender privilege system. The question, "Is it a boy or a girl?" is directed
at identifying the individual's group membership. The very need to ask the
question implicitly recognizes that a reality of group treatment coexists with the
aspiration for individual treatment.
An individual woman deserves the equal protection of the laws. But it is only
an individual's status as a member of the group "women" or the group "men" that
makes the Court notice the need for that protection, because the Court has
recognized sex as a salient identity characteristic. 96  Thus the individual is
inextricably intertwined with the group. Because legal liberalism has regarded the
groups "women" and "men" as the same, the Court's legal analysis has been
hampered.
The following example illustrates the dilemma in legal analysis for the Court.
A married woman's family was not protected by automatically receiving social
security survivor's benefits upon her death. 97 The family of a married man who
died under the same circumstances would receive the survivor's benefits. Martha
Chamallas explains that the Court in this fact pattern faced a doctrinal dilemma
about "how to characterize the discrimination at issue in the case." 9
From the perspective of the social security beneficiaries, the statute
seemed clearly to favor women (i.e., widows) and to discriminate against
men (i.e. widowers). After all, it was men who suffered direct economic
loss by the denial of government benefits. When the statutory scheme
was viewed from the perspective of the now-deceased workers who had
paid social security taxes, however, it looked more like discrimination
against women workers. The argument was that the labor of similarly
situated employed men and women yielded greater benefits to the man's
family than to the woman's family.99
95. See MARILYN FRYE, THE POLITICS OF REALITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 19-34 (1983)
(discussing sex announcing and the necessity of determining gender).
96. The use of the terms "sex" and "gender" to delineate the salient identity characteristic could be
an entire separate article. Neither judges nor feminist scholars agree about the usage of these terms.
KATHARINE T. BARTLETT, ANGELA P. HARRIS & DEBORAH L. RHODE, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY,
DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 3d 1248-50 (2002) (describing different viewpoints); see also Stephanie
Riger, Rethinking the Distinction Between Sex and Gender in LESLIE BENDER & DAAN BRAVEMAN,
POWER, PRIVILEGE, AND LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 232-40 (1995) (explaining that gender and sex
are difficult concepts to detach from each other).
97. Weinberger, 420 U.S. 636; see also Chamallas, Bias, supra note I1, at 757 (discussing this
example).
98. Chamallas, Bias, supra note 11, at 757.
99. Id. at 757-58.
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Liberal legalism and the comparison mode used in antidiscrimination law placed
the Court into this doctrinal dilemma forcing a choice about how to characterize the
facts to enable a finding of discrimination. The Court did choose to focus on the
injury to working women, providing an early example of judicial recognition of the
devaluation of women's work.' 00 But the devaluation of women's work is a key
characteristic of the systemic privileging of maleness. A privilege lens would have
removed the Court from this dilemma.
In her important addition to the literature on the legal understanding of bias,
Martha Chamallas outlines the narrow focus of antidiscrimination laws.' The law
insists on "formal or facial equality,""1 2 frowning on both "explicit classifications
by legislative bodies" or formal policies that "expressly provide for different
standards for minorities, women, or other traditionally disfavored groups."'0 3 The
legal focus on intentional discrimination means that legal remedies miss the subtle
forms of discrimination that are "often nondeliberate or unconscious."'04
Devaluation and biased prototypes are forms of bias that are not the product of
deliberate discrimination.'05
Chamallas explains that bias and stereotypes impact decisionmaking. 10 6
Existing equal protection doctrine is most useful for addressing the affective
component of bias, including prejudice and hostility.'0 7  However, the existing
interpretation of equal protection doctrine fails to address the cognitive component
of bias, including stereotyping, devaluation, and biased prototypes. "Stereotypes
about the group infect how decisionmakers perceive and interpret events, remember
facts and later make judgments."'1  These forms of cognitive bias involve "the
100. Id. at 758.
101. Chamallas, Bias, supra note 11, at 747.
102. Id. at 748.
103. Id. at 747-48.
104. Id. at 753.
105. See Chamallas, Bias, supra note 11, at 755 (addressing two forms of bias: devaluation and
biased prototypes). Chamallas uses "devaluation" in those situations which do not present a clear-cut
case of disparate treatment. Id. at 756. Devaluation has the following features, according to Chamallas:
(1) Devaluation does not operate at the individual or group level. Rather, it operates to affix
a "gender" or "race" label to a neutral activity, while also placing a hierarchy of value to that
activity.
(2) Devaluation often has material effects resulting from the judgment of value given to the
activity.
(3) Devaluation is often selective in its operation. Some members of the disfavored groups
are able to escape the effects of devaluation. Other group members may even benefit from
the devaluation that is harmful to the majority.
(4) The devaluation of a disfavored group is often masked.
(5) While devaluation has a number of features making it distinct from disparate treatment,
"at its core devaluation is nevertheless comparative."
Id. at 772-75. The other form of cognitive bias that Chamallas addresses is biased prototypes in which
stock images, mental portraits, schemas, or cultural scripts all work to limit the protection of the law for
marginalized groups. Id. at 778. Biased prototypes provide a "cognitive shortcut" for classification,
infecting "the process of judgment in a systematically biased way." Id. at 778-79.
106. Id. at 754.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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largely unconscious processes of selective noticing, remembering, and processing
information about social groups."'19  A focus on privilege in equal protection
claims would provide an avenue for addressing the impact of these biases.' 0
The idea that systemic privileging is relevant to equal protection inquiries is
not a new idea. The Court recognized systemic privilege in early equal protection
litigation before it began interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment as focusing on
discrimination. Loving v. Virginia"' supports the proposition that the Fourteenth
Amendment was passed to strike down white supremacy, the definitive racial
privilege. 2 In Loving, a challenge to a state anti-miscegenation statute, the Court
declined to use the comparison mode of formal equality theory,' comparing the
treatment of blacks to whites.1 4 One argument made to uphold the statute had
urged that both groups were treated equally under the statute since both groups
were forbidden from interracial marriage." 5 Responding to this comparison mode
argument, the Court reasoned that prior decisions upholding the constitutionality of
these anti-miscegenation provisions had "concluded that the State's legitimate
purposes were 'to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens,' and to prevent 'the
corruption of blood,' 'a mongrel breed of citizens,' and 'the obliteration of racial
pride.""' 6  The Court commented that these reasons were "obviously an
endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy.""' 7 This restriction of citizens'
rights on account of race indicated to the Court that the Virginia measure at issue
had been enacted to maintain white supremacy.1' Thus in its reasoning striking the
109. Id. at 754 n.35.
110. Understanding the linkage between the treatment of individuals and the role that group
membership plays in cognitive processes is central to understanding systemic privilege and closing the
gap in equal protection jurisprudence. The literature on bias and mental processes sheds light on the
individual-group interrelation and why equal protection analysis cannot ignore that dynamic. The larger
project will explore this fruitful avenue for further examination.
111. 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
112. Id. at 7, 11.
113. Under the comparison mode of formal equality theory, the Court considers whether a
complainant is similarly situated to other individuals. See Wildman, supra note 19, at 270. Comparison
of the plaintiff to others is essential to this analysis. Id. Though the comparison mode is not mandated
by the Fourteenth Amendment, it dominates equal protection review. Id. at 272. The comparison mode
perpetuates sex discrimination and allows courts to maintain an ambivalent attitude toward ending it. Id.
at 305-06. The fact that men and women are not similarly situated must be acknowledged as a starting
point for any meaningful equal protection review. Id.
114. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8.
115. Id.at7-8.
116. Id. at 7.
117. Id.
118. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (stating, "The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages
involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justification,
as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy"). The Loving Court did describe, in the same
passage, the Fourteenth Amendment as aimed at ending discrimination. The Court said:
At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications, especially
suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny," and, if they are ever to
be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible
state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was the object of the
Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate.
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statute, the Loving Court also demonstrated support for a view that the Equal
Protection Clause should combat white supremacy and the white privilege implicit
within racial classifications designed to maintain that supremacy.1 9 Read as such,
the Equal Protection Clause sustains challenges to systemic privilege that
perpetuates the subordination of non-white racial groups to whites.
Two recent gender cases provide support for the idea that systems of privilege
are relevant to equal protection, even though the Court has not used the term
"privilege" in its analysis. These decisions further support the view that
participation in democracy remains a key goal of equal protection, evidencing how
systemic privilege violates the equal protection of the laws.
J.E.B. v. Alabama, E0 involved a determination of paternity and assessment of
child support. 121 The state used its peremptory challenges to strike male jurors
from the pool, resulting in the selection of an all female jury.122 That jury found
that the petitioner had fathered the child and the Alabama court ordered him to pay
support.'23 On the appeal from that decision, the Supreme Court stated its holding
forcefully:
Today we reaffirm what, by now, should be axiomatic: Intentional
discrimination on the basis of gender by state actors violates the Equal
Protection Clause, particularly where, as here, the discrimination serves
to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes
about the relative abilities of men and women.'24
In finding unconstitutional the use of gender as a proxy for juror competence and
impartiality, the Court recognized the existence of bias based on group
membership, although it characterized the conduct taken in reliance on those biases
as discrimination.'25 However, those biases are also related to the systemic
privileging of maleness that fostered male democratic participation in the form of
jury service. This privileging resulted in the historic exclusion of females from
juries. 26
Id. at I I (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)). But the Court's description of the
Clause as aimed at ending discrimination does not mean that it was not also combating privilege.
119. The view of Loving as an anti-subordination decision is consistent with this idea. See e.g.,
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the
Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2256 (2002) (interpreting Loving as an anti-subordination
decision) and Cheryl I. Harris, Equal Treatment and the Reproduction ofInequality, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1753, 1763 n.25 (200 1) (similarly interpreting Loving as an anti-subordination decision); see also,
Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle,
90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 4-5, 22-26 (1976) (supporting the view that the Equal Protection Clause has been
used to combat practices that are facially neutral but that disproportionately impact members of a certain
race); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV.
493, 562-63 (2003) (supporting a vision of Equal Protection aimed at ending racial hierarchy).
120. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
121. Id. at 129.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 130-31.
125. Id. at 129.
126. JE.B., 511 U.S. at 131 (explaining that "[g]ender-based peremptory strikes were hardly
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The Court's reasoning in support of this holding, that gender could not be used
as a proxy for juror competence, recounted the exclusion of women from juries
until the twentieth century. The absence of women hearkened back to the English
common law exclusion based on "the defect of sex." '127 This so-called "defect" was
not shared equally by men and women; the referent of defect was women. As the
Court explained, women's fragility, timidity, and delicacy had been cited
historically as characteristics that demonstrated women's lack of juror
qualifications.'28 Women's paramount role as wife and mother lent further support
to the argument for their exclusion. The Court characterized these arguments as
"outdated misconceptions" about the role of women in the world.'29 The Court
acknowledged that "the two sexes are not fungible."' 30 At the same time the Court
condemned gross generalizations based on gender, as it had condemned those
based on race."'
The Court's opinion described the privileging of men in jury service and the
systemic exclusion of women. The Court objected to the use of gender as a proxy
for exclusion, both historically as applied to women, and in the present case, as
applied to a man. Thus the Court was denying the legitimacy of action taken based
on group identity, while recognizing the saliency of that group identity. This thread
of the Court's reasoning, resistance to thinking about individuals as parts of groups,
was not the only possible reaction to the realization of the existence of group
identity. Recognizing that linking individuals to group identities is part of systemic
privilege would be another response. Viewing individuals as unconnected to
groups merely veils systemic privilege. Thus privilege remains invisible until the
individual-group interrelation is considered. Only by viewing the treatment of the
individual as part of the salient identity group can systemic privilege and
disadvantaging be revealed.
In J.E.B., the Court described the systemic privileging of maleness that led to
women's exclusion from juries and condemned that exclusion. The Court applied
its condemnation to any group-based, gender stereotyping eliminating an individual
juror based on sex. The Court could see the operation of the individual-group
interrelationship in the context of a male plaintiff protesting the exclusion of men
from his jury. The Court did not describe its holding that gender not serve as a
proxy for juror competence as striking privilege, in this case privileging women,
but that was its effect. 132
The Court further exhibited its comprehension of the connection between
practicable during most of our country's existence, since, until the 20th century, women were
completely excluded from jury service."); see Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 58 (1961) (upholding juror
registration statute exempting women from mandatory jury service); but see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 525 (1975) (striking a similar statute).
127. JE.B., 511 U.S. at 132.
128. Id. at 131-32.
129. Id. at 135.
130. Id. at 133 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946)).
131. Id. at 139.
132. Interestingly, Justice Scalia, in dissent, found the Court's discussion irrelevant to a finding of
discrimination in jury selection. It is that discussion, describing the systemic privileging of maleness, to
which Scalia objected. He would have found discrimination against the male petitioner. Id. at 156-57.
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equal protection and democratic participation, stating:
Equal opportunity to participate in the fair administration of justice is
fundamental to our democratic system. It not only furthers the goals of
the jury system. It reaffirms the promise of equality under the law-that
all citizens, regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender, have the chance to
take part directly in our democracy .... When persons are excluded from
participation in our democratic processes solely because of race or
gender, this promise of equality dims, and the integrity of our judicial
system is jeopardized.133
Thus the Court upheld the importance of democratic participation and recognized
that the reality of group membership should not hinder individuals from that
participation.
In United States v. Virginia,3 4 the Court reiterated the significance of full,
democratic, societal participation.' The Court said: "[W]omen... today count as
citizens in our American democracy equal in stature to men.1' 3 6 Again, the Court
stated the aspirational ideal of equal citizens, in the context of noticing that the
group women had been historically denied that opportunity.
The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) had boasted a long tradition as
Virginia's only exclusively male, public undergraduate institution of higher
learning. 37 Contending that the male-only admissions policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause, the United States brought suit against VMI, as well as the state
of Virginia.'38 In response to the Fourth Circuit's finding that the admissions
policy was unconstitutional, the state of Virginia proposed to create the Virginia
Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) as a parallel program to VMI' 39 This
proposal was approved by the Fourth Circuit as providing substantively comparable
educational opportunity. 140 However, the Supreme Court held that VMI's male-
only admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause and that VWIL could
not offer the same benefits to women as VMI had offered to men.'
14
In reaching this result the Court reported on the history of higher education for
women beginning in 1839 when VMI was founded and "[h]igher education.., was
considered dangerous for women. '"141 Virginia did not provide many educational
133. J.E.B.,511 U.S. at 145-46.
134. 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (holding that the state of Virginia failed to satisfy its burden of providing
an exceedingly persuasive justification for its sex-based admissions policy at the Virginia Military
Institute, or that the policy was substantially related to the achievement of such objectives).
135. Id. at 545.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 520-21.
138. Id. at 523.
139. Id. at 526.
140. 518 U.S. at 527-28.
141. Id. at 551. The Court announced a "heightened intermediate scrutiny" standard for analyzing
gender discrimination cases: in order to pass muster under an Equal Protection inquiry "[p]arties who
seek to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive
justification' for that action." Id. at 531.
142. Id. at 536.
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opportunities for women and did not introduce coeducation at the University of
Virginia until 1970. The Court characterized the historic record relating to
women's education in Virginia as "[flirst, protection of women against higher
education; next, schools for women far from equal in resources and stature to
schools for men; finally, conversion of the separate schools to coeducation.' ' 43 As
was the case in J.E.B., which involved jury exclusion, the Court in VMI
demonstrated its awareness of the privileging of maleness that hampered women's
equal participation, here in an educational setting. In finding an equal protection
violation in this exclusion, the Court utilized the Equal Protection Clause to combat
systemic privilege, without naming its reasoning as being about privilege.
The dynamic of privilege, when examined along with the individual-group
interrelation, provides a better way of understanding equality and the equal
protection of the law that the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to ensure. The
democratic ideal envisions participation in societal decisions that affect one's life,
liberty, and pursuit of happiness. Systems of privilege maintain hierarchies of
inequality, adversely impacting the possibility of full societal participation.
Examining equal protection through a privilege lens will ensure that the vision of
democratic participation, central to the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, can
become reality.
A privilege analysis helps to explain decisions that appear contradictory as the
Court moves between a focus on individuals and a recognition of group identity.
Systemic privilege denies equal protection of the laws and impedes democratic
participation. The existence of systemic privilege is a way to name the
subordinating understandings that Neil Gotanda described in this symposium.' 44 Of
course, if all legal argument really is nothing more than a part of "the political," as
many symposium speakers suggested, 45 then the use of a privilege argument alone
may not matter. Ted Shaw, in his keynote address, persuasively suggested that
claiming and reclaiming equal protection means an ongoing battle. 146 The language
of arguments, specifically making privilege visible in those arguments, is one way
to engage that battle.
143. Id. at 538.
144. See Neil T. Gotanda, Reflections on Korematsu, Brown and White Innocence, 13 TEMP. POL. &
CIV. RTs. L. REV. 663, 669 (2004) ("The persistent efforts of process theorists to look away from the
substantive claims of a subordinated group and to focus upon abstract notions of democracy strip away
any of the societal linkages that create real, social, human beings.").
145. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Politics, Not History, Explains the Rehnquist Court, 13 TEMP. POL. &
Civ. RTS. L. REV. 647, 654 (2004) (arguing politics drives Supreme Court decisions); Law, supra note
15, at 705 ("Every political lawyer and activist knows that success requires more than just a "winning"
legal argument."). See also Derrick A. Bell Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980) (contending that Blacks' interest in racial equality
"will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites"); Roberto Gargarella,
Group Rights, Judicial Review, and "Personal Motives, " ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, THE ORIGINS
AND FATE OF ANTISUBORDINATION THEORY (2002): Article 3, at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art4
(explaining one cannot expect judges to work for improving the status of minority groups).
146. See Theodore Shaw, Turning Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence on Its Head The Practical
Effects of Michigan v. Grutterfor the Future, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 963, 973 (2004).
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